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 Managing DDoS Attacks on Virtual Machines by 
Segregated Policy Management 
E. S. Phalguna Krishna α, E. S  andhya σ &  M. Ganesh Karthik ρ 
Abstract-  Security is considered as most crucial aspect in 
cloud computing. It has attracted lots of research in the recent 
years. On the other hand, attackers are exploring and 
exploiting the vulnerabilities in cloud. The heart of the Cloud 
computing lies in Virtualization technology. Attackers are 
taking the advantage of vulnerabilities in Virtual Machines and 
they can able to compromise virtual machines thereby 
launching DDOS attacks. Services such as Saas,IaaS which 
are meant to support end users may get affected and 
attackers may launch attacks either directly or by using 
zombies. Generally, Data Centres own security policies for 
dealing with security issues. Suppose incase of DDoS attacks, 
only the policies which deals with it ,can only been applied. 
However, in datacenters, all the security policies are 
commonly been applied on the applications irrespective of 
their category or security threats that it face. The existing 
approach consumes lots of time and wastage of resources. In 
this paper, we have developed an approach to segregate the 
applications as per the type or threats (by adapting detection 
mechanisms) being faced . Based on the zone in which it is 
lying ,  only the relevant security policies will only be applied. 
This approach is optimized where we can efficiently reduce the 
latency associated  with applying security policies. 
I. Introduction 
irtualization is considered as back bone for cloud 
computing ,With which users can access multiple 
instances of apps, resources etc.Virtualization 
technology will allow one computer to do the job of 
multiple computers.This environment  let one computer 
host multiple operating systems at the same time.It 
transforms hardware into software.It is emulation  of a 
fully functional virtual computer that can run its own 
applications and operating system and also Creates 
virtual elements of the CPU, RAM, and hard disk. 
Hardware-independence of operating system and 
applications. Hence, using virtualization it is possible to 
run operating systems  and  multiply applications on  the 
same SERVER at the same time, thereby it raises the 
utilization and flexibility of hardware. 
Some of the virtualization technologies include 
VMWare, Hyper V,Virtual Iron etc., 
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Figure 1 :  Virtualization 
a) Virtual Machines 
These are the things that can manage OS and 
application as a Single unit by encapsulating them into 
Virtual Machines. A Virtual machine (VM) is an efficient, 
isolated duplicate of a real machine.  
Virtual machines can be provisioned to any system. 
i. Duplicate 
The behaviour of the VM should be identical to 
the real machine. There is no differentiation with respect 
to the execution of the program at the low level. 
ii. Isolated  
 Multiple Virtual Instances corresponding to 
different VMs execute without interfering with each other. 
iii. Efficient   
VM should operate at the speed of the under-
lying hardware. 
All the resources of the physical computer are 
shared to create the virtual machines.By virtualization, it 
creates an emulation that user is actually using owned 
resources.But at the implementation level,these resour-
ces are shared between multiple number of users at any 
given point in time.Further,Disks are partitioned into 
virtual disks and a normal user time sharing terminal 
serves as Virtual machine operators console. 
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Figure 2 :  Virtual Machine & Its Layers 
 
Figure 3 : VIRTUAL MACHINE 
a) Types of Virtual Machines: Type 1 / Type 2  
i. Type 1  They are also Called Hypervisors or virtual 
machine monitor or VMM.Hypervisors of this type is 
dependent of bare metal (bare machine) and always 
interacts with the machine. They Sit just above the HW 
and virtualizes the complete hardware. It runs at the 
physical hardware and is the real operating system. 
Normal unmodiﬁed operating systems, like Linux or 
Windows runs atop of the hypervisor. The server which 
is hosting Type 1 Hypervisor requires some form of 
persistent storage for storing the files of concern. In ESX 
server, the kernel uses device drives to actually get 
interfaced with bare metal.  
 
• Example: Xen, VMware ESX server 
 
b)
 
Type 2 hypervisor
 
 
It is considered as most common type of 
hypervisor
 
and depends on the underlying OS.Such 
hypervisors requires to be directly installed on bare 
metal.It runs within an OS, and rely on OS services to 
manage HW. A normal unmodiﬁed host operating 
system like Linux or Windows runs on the physical 
hardware.
 
  A type 2 hypervisor like VMware Workstation 
runs on the host operating system.Once after installing 
host operating system, we can now deploy hypervisor 
and it doesn’t modify it. Examples include QEMU, 
VMware Workstation etc. 
ii. Threats on VMS 
 Like any other technology, Virtual Machines are 
prone to different categories of threats.Some attacks 
against virtual machine, or VM, environments are 
variations of common threats such as denial of service 
etc. Others are still largely theoretical but likely 
approaching as buzz and means increase, these are the 
critical weaknesses. 
a) VM Sprawl   
 VMs are easy to deploy, and many 
organizations view them as hardware-like tools that 
don’t merit formal policies. This has led to VM sprawl, 
which is the unplanned proliferation of VMs.  
           Attackers can take advantage of poorly 
monitored resources. More deployments also mean 
more failure points, so sprawl can cause problems even 
if no malice is involved. 
b) Hyperjacking  
 Hyperjacking takes control of the hypervisor to 
gain access to the VMs and their data. It is typically 
launched against type 2 hypervisors that run over a host 
OS although type 1 attacks are theoretically possible but 
practically difficult. 
 In reality, hyperjackings are rare due to the 
difficulty of directly accessing hypervisors. However,  
Hyperjacking is considered a real-world threat, and 
administrators should take the offensive and plan for it. 
c) VM escape  
 A guest OS escapes from its VM encapsulation 
to interact directly with the hypervisor.By doing so, the 
attacker can gain access to all VMs and, if guest 
privileges are high enough, the host machine can also 
be targeted as well. Although few, if any instances are 
known, experts consider VM escape to be the most 
serious threat to VM security. 
d) Denial of Service  
  Considered most common threat.These 
attacks exploit many hypervisor platforms and range 
from flooding a network with traffic to sophisticated 
leveraging of a host’s own resources. The availability of 
botnets continues to make it easier for attackers to carry 
out campaigns against specific servers and applications 
with the goal of derailing the target’s online services. 
e) Incorrect VM Isolation 
 To remain secure and correctly share 
resources, VMs must be isolated from each other. 
Improper control over VM deployments can lead to 
isolation breaches in which VMs communicate. 
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
IV
  
Is
su
e 
V
I 
 V
er
sio
n 
I 
20
  
 
(
DDDD
)
Y
e
a
r
20
14
E
© 2014   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
Managing DDoS Attacks on Virtual Machines by Segregated Policy Management
 
Attackers can exploit this virtual drawbridge to gain 
access to multiple guests and possibly the host. The 
attacker can take the loop holes in the interfaces and 
can attack. 
f) Unsecured VM migration 
  This occurs when a VM is migrated to a new 
host, and security policies and configuration are not 
updated to reflect the change. Potentially, the host and 
other guests could become more vulnerable. Attackers 
have an advantage in that administrators are likely 
unaware of having introduced weaknesses and will not 
be on alert. 
g) Host and guest vulnerabilities 
 Host and guest interactions can magnify 
system vulnerabilities at several points. Their operating 
systems, particularly Windows, are likely to have multiple 
weaknesses. Like other systems, they are subject to 
vulnerabilities in email, Web browsing, and network 
protocols. However, virtual linkages and the co-hosting 
of different data sets make a serious attack on a virtual 
environment particularly damaging. 
h) Dynamic environment 
 Tracking and updating what you have can be a 
challenge as people create, suspend and move virtual 
machines. If you don’t update your golden image from 
which virtual machines are deployed, you can end up 
needing to find and patch many virtual machines. 
i. Mitigating  Risk  
Inorder to overcome the existing problem with 
respect to the security, one can take Several steps to 
minimize risk.  
• Characterization:The first task is to accurately 
characterize all deployed virtualization and any 
active security measures beyond built-in hypervisor 
controls on VMs.  
• Standards: Security controls should be compared 
against industry standards to determine gaps. 
Coverage should include anti-virus, intrusion 
detection, and active vulnerability scanning. 
Additionally, consider these action steps: 
ii. VM traffic monitoring 
 Efficient monitoring of VM backbone network 
traffic is critical. Conventional methods will not detect 
VM traffic because it is controlled by internal soft 
switches. However, hypervisors have effective moni-
toring tools that should be enabled and tested.Also , by 
maintaining traffic logs ,one can have vigilance over the 
network traffic. 
iii. Administrative control  
 Procedures such as authentication, author-
ization, Identity management etc must be done as a 
regular process by the concerned admins.Sometimes, 
Secure access can become compro-mised due to VM 
sprawl and other issues. 
iv. Customer security 
Outside of the VM, make sure protection is in 
place for Customer interactive interfaces such as web-
sites. 
v. VM segregation 
 In addition to normal isolation, strengthen VM 
security through functional segregation. 
  For example, consider creating separate 
security zones for desktops and servers. The goal is to 
minimize intersection points to the extent feasible. 
iii. Virualization Vulnerabilities 
  Virtualization has eased many aspects of IT 
management but has also complicated the task of cyber 
security. The nature of virtualization introduces a new 
threat matrix. 
a) Single Server  
• VMs run on a single server which poses serious 
security problems. 
•  Virtual monitor should be root secure meaning that 
no privilege within the virtualized guest 
environment permits interference with the host 
system been found in all virtualization software 
which can be exploited by malicious, local users to 
bypass certain security restrictions or gain 
privileges.  
• For example, the vulnerability of Microsoft Virtual 
PC and Microsoft Virtual Server could allow a guest 
operating system user to run code on the host or 
another guest OS.  
• Vulnerability in Virtual PC and Virtual Server could 
allow elevation of privilege. 
A perfection of properties like isolation is yet to 
be completely achieved.  
b) Ease of reconfiguration 
 Ability to flexibily reconfigure restart and also 
movement of VM‘s to other servers. Because of this 
easeness, an optimal environment to propagate 
vulnerabilities and unknown configuration errors has 
been created. 
c) Dormant machines  
In public-cloud environments, VM is available to 
any application even though it is offline. 
• For example, a Web server that can access the 
physical server on which it resides.  
• So a remote user on one VM can access another 
dormant VM if both reside on the same physical 
server.  
• As Dormant machines can‘t perform malware 
scans, they are highly susceptible to malware 
attacks. 
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• Exploitation of this vulnerability is not only restricted 
to the VMs on a particular hypervisor but also affect 
other physical devices in the cloud.  
For example:  A Dormant machine might have 
been backed up or archived to another server or storage 
device.  
d) Patch management 
 Generally users does the patch management in 
cloud computing and attackers could easily misuse   
this opportunity to attack VMs.  
e) Cross-VM information leakage  
 It is the ability of a malicious instance to utilize 
side channels to learn information about co-resident 
instances. 
IV. Modules 
a) Packet Feeder   
 Packet arrives from multiple streams and they 
are feeded into the packet feeder module which acts as 
entry point for this approach. The responsibility of the 
packet feeder is to collect packets from various 
incoming streams and feed them to the module “FLOW 
DISCRIMINATOR”.    
b) Flow Differentiator 
 It differentiates as per the type of packets 
based on its properties (multimedia, text, voice, images 
etc). 
c) Decision Maker 
This Module applies “Outlier Analysis” 
technique to discriminate and differentiate different 
types of flows or vulnerablilities. For example: Normal 
traffic, Flash Crowd traffic, DDOS traffic etc. Our 
approach using Outliers requires lesser amount of 
computations and considered to be effective in 
discriminating the attacks.  
d) Zone Manager  
 Based upon the nature of VMs, it is prescribed 
to adopt necessarily relevant policies.  
i. Advantages 
  Optimizes the application of rule sets on 
different categories of applications. 
 This approach significantly reduces the time 
taken by the data center admin by applying only 
essential set of security policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii. Block diagram                       
 
V. Methodology 
 Users from various locations sends the service 
requests in the stream of packets to the Virtual servers/ 
Virtual machines, which internally utilizing virtualization 
technology. The packets arrived are feeded into the 
“Packet Feeder” module which acts as entry point for 
this approach.   The responsibility of the packet feeder is 
to collect packets from various incoming streams and 
feed them to the module “Flow Discriminator”.  
  The flow discriminator which takes various 
streams of packets as input differentiates what type of 
packet stream it is based on its properties like file 
extension, contents in the packet etc and categorizes 
them accordingly such as multimedia, voice, text, 
images etc.   The discrimation is done mainly to adopt  
the relevant decision strategies and appropriate security 
policies. All categorized packet streams are given as 
input next module named “Decision Maker”.   
Decision Maker is the most important module 
which applies Outlier Analysis technique to discriminate 
and differentiate different types of vulnerablilities in the 
flow. For example : Normal traffic, Flash Crowd traffic, 
DDOS traffic. An advantage of using Outliers in this 
approach just not only requires lesser amount of 
computations but also considered to be effective in 
terms of discriminating the attacks. 
  Finally the identified malicious traffic from 
normal traffic is sent to the   “Zone Manager” which in 
turn discriminates the DDOS traffic from FLASH CROWD 
traffic. Based upon the nature of VMs it is prescribed to 
adopt necessarily untypical policies to safeguard users 
trust. 
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This paper consists of three cases: Normal 
Traffic, DDoS, Flash Crowd. Based on the case, we 
apply the relevant necessary security policies. This is in 
converce with the previous approach, where in which 
the admins of the data centre used to adopt common 
security policies for discrete set of applications. The 
previous approach not only consumes time but also 
leads to consuming more number of processor cycles. 
VI. Analogy 
Normally datacenter own discrete categories of 
applications. Inorder to provide the security, each and 
every data center maintains set of security policies.It 
specifies what it means to be secure for a system, 
organization or other entity. But the scenario is like data 
center admins or tools apply complete set of security 
policies irrespective of the concept thereby consuming 
lots of processor cycles and raises latency. 
In this paper, we have used an approach to 
segregate the applications as per the type or threats (by 
adapting detection mechanisms) being faced and we 
segregate them into zones. Based on the zone in which 
it is lying, only the relevant security will only be applied. 
This approach is optimized where we can efficiently 
reduce the latency associated with applying security 
policies. 
Consider a scenario in which a data center 
hosts different set of software applications on their 
infrastructure. Let S be the main rule set, there exists 
Subsets Si, Sj, Sk. For example A, B, C, D applications 
belong to a particular type of application (multimedia) or 
facing particular threat (DDoS). Let P, Q, R & X, Y be 
different categories. Then suppose, A, B, C, D, are the 
applications that are facing DDo S attack as a threat at 
this instance, Then it may be relevant to apply for 
example Si set of rules on those machines which are 
affected by it, Instead of applying S. Where Si, Sj, Sk ⊆ 
S. We assumed applications A,B,C,D as web apps and 
they are prone to DDoS attacks and Si as the subset of  
rule set that consists of the security policies and 
mitigation strategies to be applied for DDo S. Similary Sj 
∊ (P,Q,R,S) and Sk ∊ (X,Y). 
vii. Applcations 
• The approach can be adopted to the data centres 
consisting diversified applications. 
• The approach is applicable to the data centers 
which considers security as a service. 
viii. Security Policies 
A security policy is a comprehensive document 
that defines a companies’ methods for prevention, 
detection, reaction, classification, accountability of data 
security practices and enforcement methods.It generally 
follows industry best practices as defined by ISO 17799, 
27001-02, PCI, ITIL, SAS-70, HIPPA , SOX or a mix of 
them. It is the key document in effective security prac-
tices. Following are some of the policies of data centers: 
• Develop a checklist for standard operating 
procedures to follow in the event of an attack, 
including internal firewall teams, intrusion 
detection teams and network teams. Identify who 
should be contacted during an attack, what 
processes should be followed by each and what 
information is needed. 
• ISPs and hosting providers might provide 
mitigation services. Be aware of the service-level 
agreement provisions. 
• Identify and prioritize critical services that should 
be maintained during an attack so as to keep 
resources turned off or blocked as needed to limit 
the effects of the attack. 
• Ensure that critical systems have sufficient 
capacity to withstand an attack. 
• Determine whether the denial of service attack is 
attempting to consume:  
a. Network bandwidth resources, or  
b. Server resources.  
• Separate or compartmentalize critical services, 
including public and private services; intranet, 
extranet, and Internet services and create single-
purpose servers for services such as HTTP, FTP, 
and DNS. 
• Keep network diagrams, IT infrastructure details 
and asset inventories current and available to help 
understand the environment.  
• Have a baseline of the daily volume, type, and 
performance of network traffic to help identify the 
type, target and vector of attack.  
• Identify existing bottlenecks and remediation 
actions needed. 
• Harden the configuration settings of the network, 
operating systems and applications by disabling 
unnecessary services and applications. 
• Implement a bogon (bogus IP address) block list 
at the network boundary to drop bogus IP traffic.
 
• Employ service screening on edge routers: very 
useful to decrease the load on stateful security 
devices such as
 
firewalls.
 
a)
 
Mitigation Strategies of DDOS attacks in data 
centres
 
 
Data centres cannot rely on their ISP alone to 
provide a complete DDoS solution that includes 
application layer protection.
 
To protect against application-layer DoS, 
several mitigation strategies can be considered:
 
i. Traffic subjected to rate limits, prioritization, and 
load balancing.
 
ii. Fast-expiring session aging
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iii. Two-factor authentication to validate user roles, 
especially at admin levels. 
iv. Advanced next generation firewalls (NGFWs), 
such as Fortinet’s FortiGate products, offer DDoS 
and IPS services. 
v. Dedicated DDoS Attack Mitigation Appliances: 
These are dedicated hardware-based devices 
that are deployed in a data centre  used to detect 
and stop basic (layer 3 and 4) and advanced 
(layer 7) DDoS attacks. 
vi. Deployed at the primary entry point for all web-
based traffic, they can both block bulk volumetric 
attacks and monitor all traffic coming in and 
leaving the network to detect suspicious patterns 
of layer 7 threats. 
b) Top three mitigation solutions 
To make services more robust against a DDoS 
attack, the following combination of strategies are prop-
osed, they are: 
i. Increase the barrier to entry by using a Pricing-
Based Scheme 
 Price of entry varies with the load level. This will 
throttle the machines used in the attack, thereby forcing 
the attacker to employ (or subvert) a larger number of 
machines. 
ii. Differentiated model 
 Allocating a priority mechanism to desirable 
clients is key which Provides prioritized access to 
classes of users though a DDoS attack will raise the 
price so high that lower priority classes get locked out, 
higher priority clients can still access the service. 
iii. Dynamic and Differential pricing mechanism  
 This will be applied to penalize clients who are 
responsible for a load on the server and it typically 
requires flow monitoring and isolation capabilities. 
c) Flash Crowd Mitigation Strategies 
1. Adaptive Admission Control Based on Application-
Level Observations. 
2. Flash Crowd Detection within the realms of an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP). 
3. Dynamic CDN against Flash Crowds. 
4. Managing Flash Crowds on the Internet 
5. Handling Flash Crowds  from your Garage 
6. KadCache: Employing Kad to Mitigate Flash 
Crowds and Application Layer DDoS Attacks 
Against Web Servers. 
IX. Conclusion 
The flow differentiator is responsible to identify 
and discriminate attack ,normal flows.Further, we apply 
zone managers,which will move VM’s & its applications 
to respective zones .Only the relevant security policies 
will only be applied on  the VM’s which are running 
those  applications  that are affected with security 
vulnerabilities. Our approach is considered to be 
effective in optimizing the security policies. Further, this 
approach is considered to be effective and consumes 
less resources and time. 
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